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Globalization and Innovation in Emerging Markets
*
 
Globalization brings opportunities and pressures for domestic firms in emerging market 
economies to innovate and improve their competitive position. Using recent data on firms in 
27 transition economies, we test for the effects of globalization through the impact of 
increased competition and foreign direct investment on domestic firms’ efforts to raise their 
capability (innovate) by upgrading their technology or their product/service (improving quality 
or developing a new one), taking into account firm heterogeneity. We find support for the 
prediction that competition has a negative effect on innovation, especially for firms further 
from the frontier, and that the supply chain of multinational enterprises and international trade 
are important channels for domestic firm innovation. We do not find support for the inverted U 
effect of competition on innovation. There is partial support for the hypothesis that firms in a 
more pro-business environment invest more in innovation and are more likely to display the 
inverted U relationship between competition and innovation. 
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1.  Introduction 
With the opening of borders to trade and foreign investment, globalization brings 
opportunities and pressures for domestic firms in emerging market economies to innovate 
and improve their competitive position. Many of these pressures and opportunities 
operate through increased competition from and linkages with foreign firms.  In this 
paper, we use the conceptual frameworks of a recent theoretical model by Sutton (2007) 
and a series of models by Aghion et al. (2005a, 2005b and 2006), to examine the 
determinants of innovation by domestic firms in emerging market economies. Our focus 
is on the effect of competition and transfer of capabilities stemming from globalization, 
which may be brought about through various channels, including the entry of foreign 
firms (foreign direct investment – FDI), trade, and increased competitive responses by 
domestic firms through both entry and upgrading of the quality of their products. Our 
work also relates to the large literatures on innovation
1 and FDI spillovers;
2 while we 
focus on testing the theoretical proposition of the specific models above, we also relate 
our findings to these broader literatures. 
Sutton (2007) develops an industrial organization model capturing the effect of 
globalization on the behavior of firms in the emerging market economies. The model 
assumes that a firm’s competitiveness depends not only on its productivity but also on the 
quality of its product, with productivity and quality jointly determining a firm’s 
“capability.” In particular, Sutton’s (2007) model has the property that consumers choose 
to buy on the basis of price-quality combinations and if a firm has a product whose 
quality is superior to that of its rivals, the firm will retain some level of market share even 
when the number of low quality rivals becomes arbitrarily large. Moreover, there is a 
lower bound on quality that any firm has to maintain in order to survive, thus creating a 
range (“window”) of quality levels in which firms can operate. What matters is relative 
quality at both the firm and country levels, and with globalization the lower bound on the 
                                                 
1 See e.g., Becheikh, Landry and Amara, 2006 and Cohen, 2005 for reviews of literature on innovation. 
2 See e.g., Gorg and Greenaway, 2004 for a review of the FDI literature.   3
window of opportunity rises for firms that were previously shielded from the competition 
by higher quality firms in advanced economies. 
An important prediction of the Sutton (2007) model is that after an initial 
shakeout, firms in emerging markets will strive to adjust by raising their capabilities. 
Sutton (2007) suggests that the process will vary widely across industries and stresses 
that it will be influenced by the vertical transfer of capabilities to the emerging market 
economies through the supply chain of multinational enterprises (MNEs). In fact, he 
argues that “…the ‘middle group’ countries of Eastern Europe… are best placed to be the 
most dramatic beneficiaries of the present globalisation, not – or not primarily – because 
of trade liberalization per se, but because of the virtuous dynamic that follows as part of 
the general package of liberalization of foreign direct investment and capability transfer.” 
(Sutton, 2007, p. 28) Given these predictions, we examine the factors that determine 
whether or not different types of firms raise their capabilities. In line with Sutton’s 
conceptual framework, we look at factors that may influence capability at the level of the 
firm, industry and country or region. 
A related theoretical framework has been advanced in a series of recent papers by 
Aghion et al. (2005a , 2005b, 2006). In these Schumpeterian models, firms or industries 
operate within a range (window) of efficiency and increased competition associated with 
liberalization and globalization has different effects on firms/industries depending on 
their level of technology.  In particular, firms/industries close to the frontier (maximum 
efficiency) are expected to be spurred by competition to innovate and increase their 
efficiency, while those far from the frontier (near the lower bound) are expected to be 
discouraged from innovating and fall further behind.  In their (2005a) model competition 
discourages laggard firms from innovating, labeled the “Schumpeterian effect,” but 
encourages “neck-and-neck” firms to innovate, which they label the “escape-competition 
effect.”  Aghion et al. (2005a) develop the hypothesis, proposed earlier by Kamien and 
Schwartz (1972), that the effect of the intensity of product market competition on the 
extent of innovation is in the form of an inverted U.  The inverted U relationship is   4
derived from the balance between the opposing effects of competition on the two types of 
firms (the neck-and-neck and the laggard firms).
3   Finally, in an extension to this model 
Aghion et al., (2005b) also predicts that firms located in regions with more pro-business 
institutions are more likely to respond to the threat of entry (competition) by investing in 
new technologies and production processes. 
Whereas the predictions of the Sutton model have yet to be tested empirically, the 
predictions of the Aghion et al. (2005a, 2005b, 2006) models have been tested in a few 
studies and the tests have yielded mostly but not completely supporting evidence. We 
briefly review these tests and existing evidence in order to place our results in a 
comparative perspective. 
Using an unbalanced panel of 311 firms listed on the London Stock Exchange 
between 1973 and 1994, Aghion et al. (2005a) construct a two-digit SIC industry panel of 
354 industry-year observations. Using the price cost margin (markup) as the competition 
indicator and citation-weighted patents as a measure of innovation, the authors find an 
inverted U effect of competition on innovation.  Aghion et al. (2006) combine a variety 
of US and UK data sources to create a 1987-93 annual panel data set of over 23,000 
establishments in 180 4-digit manufacturing industries and a data set of patents in over 
1,000 incumbent UK firms. They find that technologically advanced entry by foreign 
firms has a positive effect on innovation in sectors initially close to the frontier and that 
the effect of entry on total factor productivity growth interacts negatively with the 
distance to the frontier.  
Carlin, Schaeffer and Seabright (2004) also test the inverted U hypothesis using 
data on transition economies (the 1999 Business Environment and Enterprise 
Performance Survey, BEEPs).  They examine the effect of product competition (defined 
as the number of competitors in the firm’s main product line) on innovation (defined as 
the number of innovative activities undertaken in introducing a new product or upgrading 
                                                 
3 Although their theory does not directly predict an inverted U relationship, it does exclude the possibility 
of a U shaped relationship.   5
an existing one) and growth.  Using different variables in a related data they reached the 
same basic conclusion we did in that innovation is higher in monopolistic industries. We 
build on these findings by using additional (2002 and 2005) BEEPS data and examining 
the effect of competition in greater depth. 
Studies have also examined the heterogeneity in firms’ responses to product 
competition in terms of changes in their productivity (the other part of “capability”).  
Aghion et al. (2005b) hypothesized that within industry variation in firm performance 
should increase with competition, as those firms further from the frontier and in regions 
with poorer business institutions invest less while those close to the frontier will invest 
more in new technologies and production processes. They analyze a three-digit-industry 
data available for all the states in India for the period 1980-97 and find that entry 
liberalization (de-licensing) led to an increase in within-industry inequality in output, 
labor productivity and total factor productivity. Sabirianova, Svejnar and Terrell (2005a, 
2005b) also find support for heterogeneous effects of firm entry on firm performance in 
Russian and Czech industrial firms. They find that entry by foreign firms in a given 
industry has a positive effect on the productivity of foreign firms (which are at or close to 
the frontier) but a negative effect on the productivity of domestic firms (which are 
laggards compared with foreign firms).  
In this paper, we extend the literature by testing the following predictions derived 
from Aghion et al., (2005a, 2005b, 2006) and Sutton (2007), using 2002 and 2005 data on 
firms in 27 transition economies:  
i.  Globalization stimulates innovation by domestic firms in less developed 
countries through the supply chain of MNEs (transfer of capabilities); 
ii.  Globalization increases competition (through entry of foreign firms, increased 
capabilities of domestic firms, etc.), whose effect on innovation depends on 
firms’ technological capabilities: 
a.  Firms close to the frontier at similar technological levels (neck-and-
neck) are spurred to innovate,  
b.  Firms further away from the frontier (laggard firms) are discouraged 
from innovating,    6
c.  In general, the effect of competition on innovation is hypothesized to 
have an inverted U shape. 
d.  The inverted U relationship between competition and innovation is 
steeper among firms that are closer to the frontier. 
iii.  Firms that are located in regions with different business environments 
(institutions) will respond to globalization’s competitive pressure in a 
heterogeneous manner.  Firms in regions with more-business friendly policies 
are more likely to respond to competition with more innovation than those in 
less-business friendly environments. 
2.   Data and Econometric Specification 
To test these predictions, we use data from the 2002 and 2005 Business 
Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS), a joint initiative of the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the World Bank Group. 
These are large surveys of enterprises (6,500 in 2002 and 7,900 in 2005) in 27 transition 
countries (including Turkey)
4 which relied on very similar sampling frames and identical 
questionnaires. In each country, the sectoral composition of the sample in terms of 
manufacturing
5 versus services
6 was to be determined by their relative contribution to 
GDP.  Firms that operate in sectors subject to government price regulation and prudential 
supervision, such as banking, electric power, rail transport, and water and waste water, 
were excluded from the sample.  The sample includes very small firms with as few as 
two employees as well as firms with up to 10,000 employees.  Moreover, the data include 
firms in the rural areas as well large cities.  Hence these data enable us to analyze quite 
heterogeneous firms in these countries, and perhaps most important is the inclusion of 
firms in the service sector, which is the new dynamic sector in these economies. 
In addition, the data set contains a panel component, where 1,443 firms that were 
surveyed in 2002 were surveyed again in 2005. We use this panel data set for an 
                                                 
4  Both were to be administered to 28 transition economies: 16 from CEEE (Albania, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Former Yugoslavia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia and Turkey) and 12 from the CIS (Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and 
Uzbekistan). In neither year could the survey be administered in Turkmenistan. 
5 Manufacturing includes mining and quarrying, construction, manufacturing and agro-processing. 
6 Services  includes:  Transportation, storage and communications; wholesale, retail, repairs; real estate, 
business services; hotels and restaurants; other community, social and personal activities; and commerce.   7
important robustness check. However, our analysis relies primarily on the pooled 2002 
and 2005 data since many variables of interest have a retrospective component and 
because it is hard to detect robust relationships with a small panel of relatively volatile 
firms, especially when we use many control variables. 
An important advantage of our data is that firms self-report various types of 
innovation activity.  Most studies on innovation use patent data or R&D expenditures, 
which are problematic. Patents are generally viewed as having several weaknesses: 1) 
patents measure inventions rather than innovations; 2) the tendency to patent varies 
across countries, industries and processes; and 3) firms often use methods other than 
patents to protect their innovations (such as technological complexity, industrial secrecy, 
and maintaining lead time over competitors). Using R&D expenditures may also be 
problematic because not all innovations are generated by R&D expenditures, R&D does 
not necessarily lead to innovation, and formal R&D measures are biased against small 
firms (Michie, 1998; Archibugi and Sirilli, 2001). Perhaps most important for the 
purposes of this paper is that in emerging market economies these types of innovations 
are less likely to be observed as firms are expected to engage more in imitation and 
adaptation of already created and tested innovations, rather than in generating new 
inventions and are less likely to expend resources on R&D. 
In this study, we define innovation broadly as the development/upgrading of new 
products, adoption of new technologies or obtaining quality certifications. Specifically, 
we use binary variables based on answers to the question in the BEEPS survey, about 
whether or not firms have undertaken any of the following initiatives in the last three 
years: 
•  Developed successfully a major new product line or upgraded an existing 
product line – hereafter New Product; 
•  Acquired new production technology -- hereafter New Technology;  
•  Obtained a new quality accreditation (such as ISO 9000, 9002 or 14000, 
AGCCP, etc.) -- hereafter New Accreditation.     8
We are concerned with “product innovation” rather than “process innovation,” although 
the new technology and the quality accreditation can reflect changes in the process with 
which the product/service is made.  Given the determination as to whether a new product 
was developed or upgraded is a subjective answer (in the variable “New Product,” which 
also includes a new service), we include the variable “New Accreditation,” which is a 
formal affirmation that the quality of the product has been upgraded according to some 
internationally established standards.   For example, ISO 9000 is a family of standards for 
quality management systems, maintained by the International Organization for 
Standardization and administered by accreditation and certification bodies.
7 However, in 
order to ensure the quality of a product, the standards monitor the process by which a 
product is produced.
8  The new technology that is used in the firm can be developed by 
the firm although very few (17%) who answered that they acquired a new technology 
gave this as the way it was acquired; or it can be embodied in new machinery or 
equipment which might be purchased or licensed from other sources (75%) or it can be 
acquired by hiring new personnel (5%) or it can be transferred from elsewhere 
(universities, business associations, etc., 3%). 
The BEEPS data also permit us to capture the degree of competition faced by 
each firm in various ways.  A key variable that is comparable with that used by Aghion et 
al. (2005a), as well as Nickell (1996), is the price-cost margin or markup (Markup).  
Firms that are able to charge a larger markup are deemed to have less competition.  The 
advantage of this indicator over a market share or Herfindahl index is that it does not 
require precise definition of geographic and product markets, which is difficult to obtain 
in emerging market economies that vary considerably by size and geographic reach of 
                                                 
7 Although the standards originated in manufacturing, during WWII when there were quality problems in 
many British high-tech industries, they are now employed across a wide range of sectors. A "product", in 
ISO vocabulary, can mean a physical object, or services. 
8 Some of the requirements in ISO 9001 (which is one of the standards in the ISO 9000 family) would 
include: a) a set of procedures that cover all key processes in the business; b) monitoring processes to 
ensure they are effective; c) keeping adequate records; d) checking output for defects, with appropriate 
corrective action where necessary; e) regularly reviewing individual processes and the quality system itself 
for effectiveness; and f) facilitating continual improvement.    9
firms.  We are also able to capture the effects Pressure from Foreign Competition with 
three dummy variables for “low” (slightly important) and “medium-high” (fairly and very 
important), with “not important” as the base response.  (For more detail, see the 
description of variables in Table A1.) 
Foreign firms can spur innovation among domestic firms through competition but 
they can also directly transfer capabilities.  BEEPS also permits us to capture in various 
ways the extent to which there may be a vertical linkages with foreign firms which allow 
for transfer of capabilities or “spillovers” as referred to in the FDI literature, which has 
found that vertical linkages with foreign firms in the country through trade can improve a 
domestic firm’s productivity (see e.g., Gorg and Greenaway, 2004; Gorodnichenko, 
Svejnar and Terrell, 2007).
9  We use three variables: SMNE, the share of a firm’s sales to 
MNEs;
10 Exports, share of sales exported; and Imports, share of inputs imported.  
To test whether firms that are further away from the efficiency frontier innovate 
less than firms that are closer to the frontier, we define the frontier as  the best (the most 
efficient one-third of) foreign firms and then calculate each domestically-owned firm’s 
distance from the frontier.  We draw on the literature on matching (e.g., Rosembaum, 
2002) and measure the distance between a domestically-owned firm and the leading 
foreign-owned firms in an industry and country with the Mahalanobis distance, which 
assumes that firms that are similar in a set of observed characteristics are likely to have 
similar efficiency. Conversely, if the observed characteristics of domestic firms are 
different from those of the best foreign-owned firms, the domestic firms are likely to be 
less efficient than the best foreign-owned firms. One may hence interpret this difference 
as the distance from the best business practice of foreign-owned firms. The Mahalanobis 
distance of domestic firm i to a foreign firm is equal to:  
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9 In the most recent literature, work is being done to test the channels through which these spillovers are 
occurring.  For example, Javorcik and Spartareanau (2007) ask whether it is through direct training or loans 
from MNEs. 
10 An MNE is defined as a firm with 50% or more foreign ownership.   10
Where superscripts F  and D denote the best foreign-owned firms and domestic 
companies, respectively, and Sx is the covariance matrix of the vector of observed 
characteristics x. This amounts to computing the distance of a given domestic firm to all 
foreign firms that embody the frontier and taking the minimum distance. In other words, 
we take the distance to the nearest relevant foreign firm.  The vector of observed 
characteristics contains the size of the firm in terms of the logarithm of number of 
employees and number of establishments; the structure of employment (educational 
attainment, share with, vocational school, secondary school, college; skill level: share of 
managers, share of professional workers; share of permanent workers), capacity 
utilization in terms of machinery and labor, markup, share owned by largest 
shareholder(s); growth rates (of sales and capital); a dummy for paying for security. We 
match firms exactly by industry, country and year, i.e., domestic firms are matched only 
to foreign-owned firms in the same industry, country and year. Since the distance is 
skewed, we take log(1 ) distance +  as the distance from the frontier in our specification.  
The larger the Mahalanobis distance, the further the domestic firm is from the best 
foreign firms in its industry/country. 
We estimate the following baseline specification with the pooled data in the 2002 
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where I is the dummy variable equal to one if firm reported an innovation and zero 
otherwise; Φ  denotes c.d.f. of a standard normal random variable; i, s, c and t index 
firms, sector, country and time. Variables dated with period  3 t −  are  taken  from 
retrospective questions about the firm’s performance three years prior to the current date. 
The first two variables capture our measures of competition: Markup, and ForComp 
(pressure from foreign competition). The next three explanatory variables captures   11
vertical linkages or transfer of capabilities: SMNE -- the share of sales to multinational 
enterprises, Export -- the share of export in sales and Import -- the share of imported 
imports.
11  The variable distance is the Mahalanobis distance and ω  is a set of industry, 
country and time fixed effects. The last set of variables control for a number of firm-
specific factors deemed to be important in the literature:  
L (the number of employees) and L
2 measure the size of firm, which has been 
found to be positively correlated with innovation. The argument for including size is that 
large companies have more resources to innovate and can benefit from economies of 
scale in R&D production and marketing;
12   
CU (Capacity Utilization) is the percentage of a firm’s output relative to 
maximum possible output. Although capacity utilization has been found to be a strong 
predictor of innovations (e.g. Becheikh et al., 2006), the effect of CU on innovation is a 
priori indeterminate.  If firms are too busy filling demand, they may be more interested in 
extending their current capacity than finding new ways of producing goods and services. 
At the same time, if firms are at capacity they may need to innovate; 
EDU (the share of workers with a university education) and SKILL (the share of 
skilled workers) capture Human Capital in the firm.  These variables might be expected 
to be positively correlated with innovation if EDU reflects the involvement of workers in 
R&D and more skilled workers (SKILL) are able to give feedback to the firm on how to 
improve a product;  
Age of the firm in number of years since the firm began operations in the country), 
where two hypotheses are plausible – one suggesting that older firms developed routines 
that are resistant to innovation and another suggesting that older firms will accumulate 
the knowledge necessary to innovate – few studies have analyzed this firm characteristic 
and there is evidence for both hypotheses; 
                                                 
11 Note that in contrast to previous literature we have firm-level variables describing linkages instead of 
industry-level variables (e.g., Bertschek 1995).  
12 This variable is probably one of the most studied firm characteristics determining innovation.   12
CNM is a dummy equal to one if the firm competes in the national markets and 
zero otherwise. We expect CNM to have a positive effect on innovation, given that the 
firm operates in a larger market. 
R&D is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm has positive expenditures on 
research and development and zero otherwise.  We have noted that much of the research 
proxies innovation with R&D expenditures.  However because not all innovations are due 
to R&D expenditures, R&D does not necessarily lead to innovation, and R&D biases 
against small firms, we do not use this as a dependent variable, but rather include it as a 
control variable that captures the extent to which R&D investment leads to innovation.  
SOE  (State Owned Enterprise) is a dummy variable equal to one if the 
government owns 50% or more of the firm and zero otherwise. This variable is expected 
to be negatively correlated with innovation for a variety of reasons, including a poor 
system of rewards for innovative activities in state-owned enterprises (SOEs);  
We report in Table A1 a detailed description of the variables and in Table A2 –
their means and standard deviations for the whole sample of domestically owned firms, 
as well as for some stratifications of the sample that we use in our analysis.  Domestically 
owned firms are defined as firms with zero share of foreign ownership. 
 
3.  Findings  
We begin by describing estimates of our baseline specification which tests for two 
of the five hypotheses described at the end of Section 1. In Section 3.2 we confront issues 
of endogeneity and undertake some robustness checks.  Once these issues are resolved, 
we proceed with testing for the other three hypotheses in Sections 3.3 - 3.5. 
 
3.1 Baseline Specification 
Our baseline specification for each of the three types of innovation, estimated 
with over 11,500 firm-level observations in the 27 countries, is reported in Table 1.   
We find that product market competition, as proxied by markup, has a negative 
effect on innovation.  In particular, the larger the markup (implying less competition), the   13
greater the probability that a firm develops a new product or acquires new technology. 
On the other hand, product market competition does not have an effect on the third 
dimension of innovation, namely obtaining a new accreditation. We also tested for the 
inverted U hypothesis by estimating a specification with markup and markup
2 and we 
found that neither coefficient was significant (results not reported here).  Hence, we do 
not find the inverted U shaped relationship between competition and innovation proposed 
by Kamien and Schwartz (1972) and developed more recently by Aghion et al. (2005a).  
Our baseline specification hence supports the basic Schumpeterian view that 
monopolistic market structures boost innovative activity.  
Greater pressure from foreign firms has a positive effect on innovation, holding 
constant vertical linkages with foreign firms.  Firms that feel pressure from foreign 
competition is “fairly and very important” in reducing their production costs are more 
likely to upgrade their product/service or acquire a new technology than firms that feel 
this pressure is “not at all important.” Firms that feel that the pressure is slightly 
important in turn have coefficient estimates that are about half the size, but only 
significant for “new technology.”  On the other hand foreign competition is not a 
determinant of new accreditation.  We conclude that the process of obtaining a new 
accreditation does not seem to be influenced by the forces of product market or foreign 
competition, whereas developing or upgrading a new product (or service) and acquiring a 
new technology are.  The latter tend to be carried out by monopolies that feel moderate to 
high pressure from foreign competition, which is consistent with the Aghion et al. 
(2005a) “escape competition” effect.  
Vertical transfer of capability from foreign to domestic firms, stressed by Sutton 
(2007) and the FDI spillover literature, are significant. As may be seen in Table 1, firms 
that have stronger vertical relationships with multinationals, either domestically (by 
supplying them) or out of the country (by exporting or importing), innovate more than 
firms that have weaker relationships. A one percentage point increase in a domestic 
firm’s share of sales to MNEs or to exports has a very similar impact on all the first    14
types of innovations and a much larger positive impact on acquiring a new accreditation.   
On the other hand, a firm’s share of inputs imported is less influential in obtaining a new 
accreditation than it is in upgrading a product or acquiring a new technology. 
Nevertheless, we conclude that vertical transfers of capability appear to be strong for all 
types of innovation. 
Using Mahalanobis distance we find support for the hypothesis that firms that are 
further away from the frontier are less likely to innovate in terms of developing a new 
product or acquiring new technology. As with markup, distance is not significantly 
related to obtaining a new quality accreditation, although the sign and point estimate of 
the coefficient is similar to those for the other two types of innovation.  
There are a number of interesting findings with respect to the control variables in 
reported in Table 1. First, larger firms tend to innovate more than smaller firms, which is 
consistent with the finding in the vast majority of the studies on innovation (see e.g., 
Becheikh, Landry, and Amara, 2006).  The size effect is linear (and with very similar 
coefficients) for new product and new technology, but for new accreditation it is 
increasing at a decreasing rate.  Second, firms with higher capacity utilization are less 
likely to innovate than firms that have more unutilized capacity.  This may imply that 
firms that are selling everything they produce feel less need or have less time to innovate 
than firms that have more down time because of low demand.  The negative effect is 
highly significant across the first two types of innovation and it is the strongest for 
developing a new product. Third, and not surprisingly, firms with positive expenditures 
on R&D are more likely to innovate than firms that spend nothing on R&D.  The 
coefficients are highly significant for all three types of innovation and a bit higher for 
developing a new product and obtaining new accreditation than for acquiring new 
technology. This suggests that the acquisition of new technology contains a somewhat 
greater element of purchase than own development through R&D in comparison to the 
other two innovations. Fourth, the effect of human capital varies across the three types of 
innovation. Having a higher share of skilled workers does not affect the probability of   15
developing a new product, acquiring new technology, or obtaining a new accreditation. 
On the other hand, as the share of workers with a university education rises, innovation is 
boosted across all three types. This result, of having a higher share of labor force with 
university education is more conducive to innovation than having a higher share of 
skilled labor, stresses the need for a highly educated labor force to improve the 
capabilities of the product or service.  Fifth, older firms are not as likely to innovate with 
respect to product and technology but have the same probability of obtaining a new 
accreditation as new firms. Sixth, state-owned (50% or more) firms are less likely to 
innovate than privately owned firms in terms of product or technology but are not 
different with respect to acquiring a new accreditation. Finally, firms that 
compete/operate in national markets are about 21% to 24% more likely to innovate in any 
of the three areas than firms that only compete/operate in a local or regional market.  This 
may reflect both the capability of the firms operating at the national level as well as the 
characteristics of the national as opposed to local environment.   
We note that the coefficients for these determinants of obtaining a new 
accreditation are not likely to be significant as often as the coefficients for the 
determinants of upgrading a product or acquiring a new technology.  The results indicate 
that something else must be driving this process; the fact that the coefficients on 
downstream linkages with MNEs are relatively large compared to those for the other two 
types of innovation, leads us to believe that accreditation is being obtained as a necessary 
condition for selling to MNEs and exporting and is not being influenced by product 
market competition. 
3.2 Econometric Issues and Robustness Checks 
The baseline specification potentially has issues of endogeneity of our firm-level 
measures of competition, transfer of capabilities and distance to the frontier. We first 
resolve these issues and then carry out a robustness checks for our Mahalanobis measure 
of the distance to the frontier.    16
3.2.1 Endogeneity of Markup.  Is the innovative activity being spurred by the 
market structure or is the market structure the result of the innovative activity? If, for 
example, firms successfully innovate they may be able to gain higher share of the market 
and prevent entry of new into the market (as noted by Aghion et al., 2005a, and others).   
In order to control for this potential endogeneity, it is necessary to find an instrumental 
variable (IV) that is correlated with markup and not with innovation.  Variables that 
capture the regulation of an industry might be considered good instruments since they 
control for entry of new firms but not necessarily innovative activity.  BEEPS provides 
several questions about regulations of which we selected the following two: 
 
Q1. Thinking now of unofficial payments/gifts that a firm like yours would make 
in a given year, could you please tell me how often would they make 
payments/gifts for the following purposes  [score on 1 (Never) to 6 (Always) 
scale]:  
–  To obtain business licenses and permits; 
–  To deal with occupational health and safety inspections; 
–  To deal with fire and building inspections; 
–  To deal with environmental inspections; 
–  To influence the content of new legislation, rules, decrees etc. 
Q2. Can you tell me how problematic are these different factors for the operation 
and growth of your business [score on 1 (No obstacle) to 4 (Major obstacle) 
scale]: 
–  Access to land; 
–  Title or leasing of land; 
–  Customs and trade regulations; 
–  Business licensing and permits; 
–  Labour regulations. 
The advantage of these questions is that they provide a measure of entry barriers at the 
firm level.   In contrast, previous literature used aggregate variables such as movements 
in exchange rates.  This difference is important because variability at the firm level 
dwarfs variability at the macroeconomic level.  Since these questions provide many 
potential instruments, we select instruments using Andrews (1999) and Hall and Peixe 
(2003).   
Results using the IV are presented in Appendix Table A4.  We find that the 
optimally selected instruments have a strong first stage fit. The first-stage F-statistic and   17
partial R2 suggest that excluded variables have strong predictive power for the markup.  
Likewise Anderson’s canonical correlation test rejects the null that instruments are 
irrelevant.  We also reject the null that the instruments are incorrectly excluded from the 
second stage regression.   
Although point estimates in the IV specification are greater than point estimates in 
the standard probit, both sets of estimates convey the same message i.e., that greater 
market power spurs innovation in introducing new products and adopting new 
technologies and has no effect on acquisition of new accreditation.
13   These results are 
similar to Aghion et al (2005a) who also find that corrections for endogeneity of the 
markup do not change qualitative results.  Because IV estimates have relatively large 
confidence intervals and we can’t reject equality of IV and standard probit estimates, we 
proceed with the standard probit estimates in the rest of the paper.   
 
3.2.2 Reverse Causality (Endogeneity) due to timing of measurement of variables. 
Because our variables for competition, vertical transfer of capabilities and distance are 
reported in the years of the survey (2002 and 2005), while innovation is measured over 
the preceding three-year periods (1999-2002 and 2002-2005, respectively), there is a 
potential problem that the causality runs from the dependent variable to the explanatory 
variables (i.e., that the regressors are endogenous). For example, while it may be that 
firms selling more to MNEs tend to innovate, it is also possible that firms that have 
innovated are more able to sell more to MNEs than firms that have not innovated. We 
address this potential problem in three ways.  
First, the reverse causality is less of a problem if the values of the explanatory 
variables in question (the firm’s competition, sales to MNEs, export, import, competition, 
and markup) do not vary much over a given three-year period. Within the subsample of 
about 1,000 BEEPs firms for which we could link the 2002 and 2005 survey data and 
hence create a panel, the correlation coefficients between the 2002 and 2005 values of 
                                                 
13 Similar to our standard probit estimates, we also find that squared markup is not statistically significant 
in the IV specifications.    18
Exports, Imports and SalesMNEs, respectively, are relatively high -- 0.95, 0.93 and 0.42. 
The competition variables are dummy variables and the probability of reporting the same 
value (staying in the same group) is around 50%. The only variable that has a relatively 
low correlation between 2002 and 2005 values is markup (0.2). All but one of these 
coefficients hence show considerable persistence, especially when one considers that a 
number of the variables are expressed as shares.  
Second, we replicate our estimates on the panel subsample of BEEPs firms, which 
allows us to regress innovation measured for the period 2002-2005 on the 2002 values of 
competition, vertical transfers, and distance from the frontier. By construction, these 
“initial value” regressions eliminate the possibility that the relationship between a firm’s 
innovation and competition, vertical transfers, and distance from the frontier is brought 
about by contemporaneous shocks to these variables, or to reverse causality. However, 
because the panel subsample is much smaller than the entire sample, we must use a more 
parsimonious specification.  Therefore, we must check whether and how our findings are 
affected by the change in specification and in the end, the smaller sample size. In 
particular, we include only the country and industry fixed effects as control variables and 
exclude the nine control variables in equation (1). Moreover, we include the competition 
variables one at a time. Finally, because of the small sample size and the fact that the 
majority of the non-zero values in the share of sales to MNEs, share of exports and share 
of imports variables are close to unity (greater than 90%), we convert these variables 
from shares into dummy variables, where 0 = no share of sales to MNEs, exports, etc..   
In order to check what drives the difference, if any, between the estimates from 
the full sample and panel data, we estimate the more parsimonious specification for 
various samples: 
(a) the full sample, using pooled 2002 and 2005 data and current 
(contemporaneous) values of the explanatory variables, as in the base specification;  
(b) the pooled 2002 and 2005 data on the panel of firms, using current values of 
the explanatory variables;    19
(c) only the 2005 data on the panel of firms, using current values of the 
explanatory variables; and  
(d) only the 2005 data on the panel of firms, using three year lagged values of the 
explanatory variables.  
The model in (a) reveals whether the more parsimonious specification applied to 
the full sample yields similar results to those in the base specification reported in Table 1. 
It also provides a benchmark against which to compare the estimates from the panel 
subsample. The estimation in (b) is identical to that in (a) except that it uses the panel 
subsample of firms. Comparing the estimates in (b) to those in (a) hence permits us to 
assess whether for the purposes of our study the panel is a representative subsample of 
the full sample. The estimation in (c) is identical to (b) but uses only the 2005 part (i.e., 
the more recent half) of the panel. Comparing the estimates in (c) to those from (b) 
permits us to infer how much significance, if any, we lose by using just the more recent 
half of the panel data observations. Finally, the results in (d) represent the ideal 
specification, which explains innovation over the 2002-05 period with the lagged (2002) 
values of the explanatory variables.
14 Comparing the results in (c) and (d) enables us to 
assess the difference in the estimated coefficients between the specification using the 
current v. the lagged values of the explanatory variables. The coefficients from each of 
these four specifications are presented in appendix Table A5 for the competition, transfer 
of capability and distance variables. 
First a comparison of the coefficients in columns (a) of each panel in Table A5 to 
the coefficients in Table 1 indicates that applying the more parsimonious model to the 
full sample yields similar coefficient signs, estimates and significance on all the variables 
with the only notable difference being that the coefficients on pressure from foreign 
competition are somewhat larger in the parsimonious specification.  
                                                 
14 This uses  data from the 2005 part of the panel for the dependent variable and data from the 2002 part of 
the panel for the independent variable.   20
A comparison of the results in columns (a) with columns (b) in each of the three 
panels of Table A5 indicates that going from over 11,500 observations in the full pooled 
sample to about 2,000 observations in the pooled panel data, holding constant the 
specification, maintains the signs and in most instances also the significance of the key 
coefficients. The only significant change in signs occurs for the coefficients on markup 
for new technology.  
Comparing columns (b) and (c) in each of the three panels of Table A5 
demonstrates that going from the 2,000 pooled panel observations for 2002 and 2005 to 
just 1,000 observations for 2005 (but estimating the same equation which still has 
contemporaneous values of the independent variables) maintains all signs and reduces the 
significance of just two coefficients. Finally, moving from columns (c) to (d), means 
using the lagged (2002) rather than the current (2005) values of the explanatory variables 
with the 2005 panel observations, reduces the significance on three and increases the 
significance on another three of the 24 coefficients. Interestingly, in the three cases where 
the coefficient becomes significant (markup for new technology and Sales to MNES for 
New Good and New Technology) it also becomes similar to the corresponding coefficient 
in the full sample estimates in column (a) of Table A5 and the corresponding coefficient 
in the base model in Table 1. 
Overall, the results in Table A5 suggest that using the large pooled sample of 
2002 and 2005 data with the current values of the competition, transfer of capability and 
distance variables is a reasonable empirical strategy that does not generate major biases 
in the estimated coefficients.  
3.2.3 Distance.  To test the robustness of the Mahalanobis distance measure, we 
re-estimate the baseline equation with a measure that captures differences in efficiency 
using the Solow residual or total factor productivity (TFP).  We compute the Solow 
residual with the cost share for labor and capital (computed for each firm and aggregated 
for a given industry in each country and year) and adjust it for capacity utilization:    21
ln ln (1 )ln ln
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where i, j, c, and t index firms, industries, countries and time. We then estimate the Solow 
distance measure as the log of the ratio of the TFP of the most efficient foreign firm in a 
given industry and country to the TFP of each domestic firm in the same industry and 
country.  
Using the Solow measure is problematic in our data since only about one-half of 
the firms report sales revenue.  With only 5,548 firm observations, we find in appendix 
Table A6 that the coefficients on Solow distance measure are similar to those of the 
Mahalanobis distance in suggesting that there is a negative and significant relationship 
between distance and innovation.  Hence, our results are robust to alternative measures of 
the distance from the frontier.  Because we lose so many observations with the Solow 
distance measure, we continue to use the Mahalanobis distance in the rest of the paper. 
 
3.3 Distance to the Frontier and the Effect of Competition and Transfer of Capability 
In this section we test whether the effect of competition and vertical transfer of 
capabilities on innovation differs by firm heterogeneity in technology. In order to do so, 
we estimate the baseline specification separately for three groups of firms, according to 
where they lie in the distribution of the Mahalanobis distance to the frontier.  The key 
hypotheses in the Aghion et al. (2005a, 2006) models are that (a) firms closer to the 
frontier are spurred by competition to innovate, while those far from the frontier are 
discouraged from innovating, (b) the inverted U relationship between competition and 
innovation is more likely to be found and be steeper among firms that are closer to the 
frontier.  
Examining the coefficients on markup and on pressure from foreign competition 
in the columns titled “close” (to the frontier), “middle” and “far” (from the frontier) in 
Table 2, we find no support for these hypotheses. Monopolists tend to innovate more in 
areas of product and technology whether they are close to or far from the frontier.  We 
also estimated this model with markup and markup
2 (results not shown here) and find   22
again that both coefficients are not significant. Greater pressure from foreign competition 
spurs type 1 and type 2 innovation among firms across the entire distribution of 
technology.  
A key hypothesis with respect to the relationship between vertical transfer of 
capabilities and innovation found in the FDI literature is that firms closer to the frontier 
are in a better position than firms farther from the frontier to imitate (absorb) the 
technology of foreign firms.  As may be seen from Table 2, we do not find support for 
this hypothesis in any of our three vertical transfer variables.  Virtually all the 
coefficients are highly significant and for most cases one cannot reject the hypothesis that 
the effects are the same for firms that are close and far from the efficiency frontier. Hence, 
Sutton’s (2007) prediction that the vertical transfer of capability is an important 
phenomenon is strongly supported, and the effect seems to be strong across the board 
irrespective of the relative efficiency of domestic firms.  
 
3.4 Heterogeneity Across Sectors and Age of Firms 
One of the key predictions advanced by Sutton (2007), which is also implicit in 
the other models, is that the effects of globalization may vary across different sectors of 
the economy. We therefore test whether the effects of competition and vertical linkages 
with foreign firms on innovation are different for firms that are in manufacturing than 
those in services and for firms that were established during communism (old) vs. firms 
created during the transition to a market economy (new). This manufacturing-service 
sector distinction is useful because the service sector is rapidly gaining in importance in 
many emerging market economies and existing studies of FDI and innovation have 
invariably used data on manufacturing rather than services.   
The estimates in Table 3 indicate that there is not much heterogeneity in the 
innovation effect of competition, vertical transfer of capabilities and distance to the 
frontier between firms in manufacturing and services. The coefficients are for the most   23
part similar.  The results hence indicate that the effect of globalization, as captured by our 
three sets of variables, is broad based and relatively similar in manufacturing and services.  
Similarly, it is of interest to assess possible heterogeneity in terms of the vintage 
of firms, defined as firms created since a country shifted from a socialist to a market-
oriented strategy of development as compared to firms established under communism. In 
particular, we check whether the two types of firms innovate differently in response to 
competition, linkages with foreign firms and distance to frontier. The literature provides 
some (although limited) guidance here, with new firms typically innovating more than 
old firms.  The results from estimating the baseline equation separately for firms that 
started operating before 1991 (Old) and since 1991 (New) are presented in Table 4. The 
results suggest there is not a statistically significant difference in the reaction of the two 
types of firms, except that the new firms are less responsive than the old ones to pressure 
from foreign competition. Moreover, greater distance to the frontier negatively affects the 
amount of innovation (all three types) among old firms, but has no effect among new 
firms.  
 
3.5 Testing for Business Environment 
We carry out two tests of the effects of differences in business environment.  First, 
we check whether general differences in levels of development of markets and 
institutions, captured by stratifying the sample by historically different regions, affect 
innovation and the effect of our three sets of variables.  Second we test whether 
differences in the level of bribery (corruption) matter.   
In Table 5, we present the coefficients from separate estimates of equation (1) for 
countries in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Central Europe and the 
Baltic (CEB) and South Eastern Europe, including Turkey (SEE).  Since markets and 
market oriented institutions are viewed as functioning better in the CEB region than in 
the CIS and SEE regions, one may expect that the dispersion of firms in terms of 
efficiency would be smaller and firms in CEB would operate more at a neck-and-neck   24
level and closer to the frontier than firms in CIS and SEE.  The Aghion et al. (2005b) 
model would predict a positive relationship between competition and innovation in the 
CEB region and a negative relationship in the two other regions.  
The coefficients on elasticity of demand in Table 5 do not support this prediction. 
Whereas the CEB coefficients on markup are positive and significant for the first two 
types of innovation, so are the coefficients for the CIS and SEE.  We also tested for an 
inverted U relationship and did not find support for it.
15  However, firms in the CEB 
region do tend to respond more positively to foreign competition in their innovative 
behavior, especially vis a vis the SEE region (again for only the first two types of 
innovation).  The CEB firms also display a more consistent positive effect on innovation 
from selling to MNEs.  Hence, we conclude that firms in the CEB region are more 
sensitive to foreign presence in their innovative activity. 
In Table 6 we present tests of whether more pro-business environment in terms of 
lower level of bribery (corruption) induces firms to respond to competition by investing 
more in innovations (Aghion et al., 2005a, 2005b).  To carry out this test we allocate 
firms into low, medium and high corruption environment category on the basis of the 
percentage of annual sales that the firms (“a firm like yours”) pay in unofficial payments 
to public officials and estimate equation (1) separately for firms in each category. The 
three categories have highly statistically different mean values of 0.005, 0.011 and 0.021, 
respectively. Overall, there do not appear to be many systematic differences between the 
estimated coefficients of firms in the low and high categories of corruption. The clearest 
difference is observed in the fact that firms in the low bribery category have a significant 
negative relationship between the distance to the frontier and all three types of innovation, 
while firms in the middle and high bribery categories register only insignificant 
coefficients. In developing a new product, the low bribery firms are also less responsive 
to sales to MNEs, but more responsive to exporting. In acquiring a new technology and 
                                                 
15 We estimated a regression with markup and markup squared, however including higher terms for markup 
makes coefficients on markup and higher order terms insignificant.     25
license, the low bribery firms generate similar patterns of coefficients as high bribery 
firms. 
 
4.  Conclusion 
In view of the recent theoretical literature on globalization and innovation, we 
have used rich firm-level data from the 27 emerging market economies of the post-
socialist republics to test important predictions about the effects of competition in the 
product market and linkages with foreign firms on domestic firms’ innovative activities, 
taking into account heterogeneity in firms’ technological capabilities. Our focus on 
innovation is motivated by the fact that innovation is widely regarded as a channel 
through which local firms try to stay competitive in the new global economy. 
Economists tend to champion the positive effects of globalization and competition. 
For example, according to Sutton (2007), the ‘middle group’ countries of Eastern Europe 
should be the most dramatic beneficiaries of globalization, especially from the transfer of 
capabilities of foreign direct investment. Others have stressed that the competitive effect 
of entry of foreign firms will strengthen the performance of domestic firms in emerging 
market economies. However, economy theory has been unclear about the effect of 
competition on innovation. The Schumpeterian view is that market power promotes 
innovation, by providing a stable platform to fund these investments and by making it 
easier for the firm to capture its benefits. This is contrasted by the view that market 
power reduces innovation by lowering the return to innovative efforts.  Empirical work 
has found both effects.  Aghion et al. (2005a, 2005b, 2006) have developed a theory that 
has reconciled these opposing views by showing that the Schumpeterian effect dominates 
in industries with laggard firms whereas the competition spurs investment among high 
performing firms.  
Our basic finding in these transition economies is that firms with market power 
are the innovators in terms of their product and technology. We do not find a strong 
differential effect of product market competition on the laggard v. the high performance   26
firms and hence, the inverted U relationship generated by the balance of these two. 
However, we find support for the hypothesis that firms further away from the frontier are 
less likely to innovate. Importantly, we find that greater pressure from foreign 
competition stimulates innovation, which might suggest support for the “escape-
competition effect” of Aghion et al. (2005a) had the effect not been present for all firms, 
irrespective of their distance from the technology frontier.  
Vertical transfer of capability from foreign to domestic firms, stressed by Sutton 
(2007), appears to be substantial for all three types of innovation that we study. This 
result suggests that the supply chain of multinational enterprises and international trade 
are important means for domestic firms to raise their capability.  
Finally, we test whether the effects of globalization vary across industries, firm 
age, and more or less pro-business environments. The results indicate that the effects of 
competition, vertical linkages with foreign firms and distance to the frontier are broad-
based and relatively similar in manufacturing and services as well as between firms 
established under communism and those created after a country shifted to a market-
oriented strategy of development. However, innovation in the old firms tends to be more 
sensitive to pressure from foreign competition. We test the Aghion et al. (2005b) 
prediction that firms in a more pro-business environment invest more in innovation and 
are more likely to display the inverted U relationship between competition and innovation.  
Stratifying firms across regions with different business environments provides little 
support for this prediction.  Moreover, when we proxy the quality of business 
environment by the extent of bribery (corruption), we do not find many systematic 
differences between firms in the low and high categories of corruption. 
Our results are both encouraging and sobering. Whereas the advocates of 
globalization and market oriented institutions will be disappointed that competition does 
not foster innovation, they will be heartened by the finding that pressure from foreign 
competition and linkages with foreign firms (within and outside of the country) do 
improve domestic firms’ innovative capacity and that there is some evidence that firms in   27
more market oriented economies tend to innovate more.  Our data set has numerous 
strengths but also some limitations.  We hope that this paper will help to design future 
surveys to address the issues we raise in the paper. 
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 Table 1: Baseline Specification for All Firms. 
   New   New  New  
   Product Technology  Accreditation 
Competition          
Markup 0.562***  0.613***  -0.061 
 (0.110)  (0.111)  (0.149) 
Pressure from foreign competition     
Low 0.051  0.071*  0.044 
 (0.035)  (0.037)  (0.048) 
Medium & High  0.101***  0.133***  0.065 
 (0.032)  (0.033)  (0.042) 
Vertical Transfer of Capability     
Share of sales to MNEs  0.224***  0.203***  0.392*** 
 (0.067)  (0.066)  (0.074) 
Export share  0.277***  0.229***  0.450*** 
 (0.079)  (0.074)  (0.081) 
Import share  0.363***  0.271***  0.201*** 
 (0.038)  (0.039)  (0.050) 
Ability     
Distance (Mahalanobis)  -0.051**  -0.049**  -0.032 
 (0.022)  (0.022)  (0.028) 
Controls     
lnL, t-3  0.120***  0.123***  0.261*** 
 (0.031)  (0.033)  (0.047) 
(lnL)
2, t-3  -0.006  -0.005  -0.012** 
 (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.006) 
Capacity utilization, t-3  -0.523***  -0.301***  -0.109 
 (0.063)  (0.064)  (0.082) 
Positive R&D dummy  0.399***  0.286***  0.359*** 
 (0.039)  (0.037)  (0.043) 
Share of skilled workers, t-3  0.059  0.008  -0.076 
 (0.045)  (0.047)  (0.062) 
Share of workers with Univ. Ed. t-3 0.207***  0.169***  0.195*** 
 (0.051)  (0.053)  (0.070) 
Firm’s age  -0.058***  -0.042**  0.023 
 (0.019)  (0.020)  (0.024) 
State owned dummy  -0.235***  -0.112**  0.012 
 (0.046)  (0.047)  (0.055) 
Compete in national markets  0.220***  0.208***  0.238*** 
   (0.033)  (0.034)  (0.045) 
No. of Observations  11,665  11,562  11,643 
 
Note: The table reports estimates of equation (1). Definitions of the variables are in Appendix Table 
A1. Robust standard errors are in parentheses and the number of observations is in brackets; * 
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.Table 2: Testing for Interaction Between Distance and Competition. 
   New Good  New Technology  New Accreditation 
   Distance to the Frontier  Distance to the Frontier  Distance to the Frontier 
    Close  Middle Far  Close  Middle Far  Close  Middle Far 
Competition                 
Markup 0.341  0.326*  0.910***  0.990***  0.309  0.682***  -0.160  -0.282  0.134 
    (0.231) (0.189) (0.172)  (0.236)  (0.199) (0.167)  (0.302)  (0.264) (0.229) 
Pressure from foreign competition                     
Low  0.134**  -0.054  0.074 0.032 0.117*  0.065  -0.044 0.099  0.100 
    (0.061) (0.062) (0.063)  (0.064)  (0.065) (0.064)  (0.080)  (0.086) (0.085) 
Medium & High  0.161***  0.016  0.123**  0.137**  0.139**  0.123**  0.078  -0.049  0.151** 
    (0.054) (0.055) (0.057)  (0.056)  (0.058) (0.058)  (0.069)  (0.076) (0.074) 
Vertical Transfer of Capability                     
Share of sales to MNEs  0.180  0.247**  0.215*  0.257**  0.168  0.178*  0.362***  0.551***  0.291** 
    (0.116) (0.124) (0.113)  (0.117)  (0.122) (0.108)  (0.126)  (0.140) (0.121) 
Export  share  0.260*  0.134 0.369***  0.273**  0.094 0.315**  0.329**  0.482***  0.612*** 
    (0.137) (0.141) (0.137)  (0.128)  (0.133) (0.127)  (0.140)  (0.148) (0.146) 
Import  share  0.418*** 0.261*** 0.409***  0.231***  0.311*** 0.270***  0.243***  0.159*  0.199** 
    (0.069) (0.067) (0.067)  (0.069)  (0.070) (0.065)  (0.087)  (0.094) (0.088) 
No.  of  observations  3,945 3,890 3,830 3,904 3,859 3,799 3,933 3,882 3,820 
 
Note: The table reports estimates of equation (1). Definitions of the variables are in Appendix Table A1. Close denotes the lowest third of firms in terms of 
distance to foreign firms; Far denotes the greatest third of firms in terms of distance to foreign firms. Robust standard errors are in parentheses and the number of 
observations is in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.Table 3: Testing for Heterogeneity in Response by Manufacturing v. Services 
   New Product  New Technology  New Accreditation 
    MNFR SERV MNFR SERV MNFR SERV 
Competition                 
Markup  0.543*** 0.578*** 0.611*** 0.573*** 0.034  0.053 
  (0.202) (0.155) (0.186) (0.168) (0.231) (0.240) 
Pressure from foreign competition        
Low  0.083 0.024  -0.004 0.125**  -0.091 0.088 
  (0.065) (0.051) (0.062) (0.057) (0.080) (0.076) 
Medium & High  0.116**  0.124***  0.076  0.161***  0.005  0.083 
  (0.055) (0.045) (0.053) (0.051) (0.065) (0.067) 
Vertical Transfer of Capability        
Share of sales to MNEs  0.226**  0.178*  0.252**  0.219**  0.411***  0.462*** 
  (0.113) (0.102) (0.104) (0.105) (0.112) (0.127) 
Export share  0.270**  0.218*  0.270***  0.197  0.378***  0.711*** 
  (0.119) (0.121) (0.103) (0.126) (0.113) (0.140) 
Import  share  0.442*** 0.277*** 0.238*** 0.255*** 0.250*** 0.111 
  (0.071) (0.053) (0.065) (0.058) (0.079) (0.080) 
Ability        
Distance (Mahalanobis)  -0.071*  -0.074** -0.041  -0.070*  -0.058  -0.079 
  (0.039) (0.035) (0.036) (0.038) (0.043) (0.053) 
No.  of  Observations  3,892 5,624 3,855 5,580 3,884 5,615 
 
Note: The table reports estimates of equation (1). Definitions of the variables are in Appendix Table A1. 
MNFR is Manufacturing, SERV is services. Robust standard errors are in parentheses and the number of 
observations is in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.   33
Table 4: Testing for Heterogeneity in Response by Old v. New Firms 
   New Product  New Technology  New Accreditation 
   Old  New  Old   New  Old   New 
Competition                   
Markup 0.499** 0.573*** 0.640*** 0.587*** -0.411  0.052 
  (0.217) (0.128) (0.217) (0.130) (0.300) (0.173) 
Pressure from foreign competition               
Low  0.176** 0.010 0.130*  0.041 0.135 0.012 
  (0.071) (0.041) (0.072) (0.044) (0.087) (0.057) 
Medium & High  0.129** 0.095** 0.127** 0.138*** 0.215*** -0.013 
  (0.062) (0.037) (0.063) (0.039) (0.075) (0.051) 
Vertical Transfer of Capability               
Share of sales to MNEs  0.187  0.224*** 0.517*** 0.061  0.433*** 0.389***
  (0.119) (0.081) (0.118) (0.081) (0.130) (0.091) 
Export share  0.352** 0.248** 0.277** 0.266*** 0.629*** 0.344***
  (0.137) (0.098) (0.127) (0.092) (0.143) (0.104) 
Import share  0.412*** 0.352*** 0.241*** 0.279*** 0.108  0.224***
  (0.081) (0.044) (0.078) (0.045) (0.095) (0.060) 
Ability        
Distance  (Mahalanobis)  -0.101** -0.031 -0.108** -0.022 -0.094*  0.006 
  (0.043) (0.026) (0.043) (0.027) (0.051) (0.034) 
Observations  3,176 8,489 3,158 8,404 3,174 8,469 
 
Note: The table reports estimates of equation (1). Definitions of the variables are in Appendix Table A1. 
Old firms are those established before 1991. Robust standard errors are in parentheses and the number of 
observations is in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.Table 5: Regional Differences 
   New Product  New Technology  New Accreditation 
    CIS CEB SEE CIS CEB SEE CIS CEB SEE 
Competition                 
Markup  0.649*** 0.527**  0.506**  0.736*** 0.732***  0.416**  0.186  -0.348  -0.079 
  (0.170) (0.211)  (0.204) (0.168) (0.227)  (0.199) (0.225) (0.311)  (0.273) 
Pressure from foreign competition                    
Low  0.100*  0.152**  -0.137**  0.047 0.229***  0.003 0.006 0.033  0.079 
  (0.054) (0.068)  (0.067) (0.055) (0.075)  (0.070) (0.073) (0.095)  (0.089) 
Medium & High  0.122**  0.247***  -0.057  0.115**  0.226***  0.131**  0.070  0.080  0.021 
  (0.052) (0.060)  (0.057) (0.052) (0.067)  (0.058) (0.068) (0.084)  (0.073) 
Vertical Transfer of Capability                    
Share of sales to MNEs  0.252**  0.235*  0.147  0.150  0.356***  0.181*  0.279**  0.688***  0.281** 
  (0.116) (0.131)  (0.107) (0.113) (0.132)  (0.105) (0.130) (0.139)  (0.128) 
Export  share  0.362**  0.085  0.434*** 0.385*** 0.029  0.279**  0.613*** 0.144  0.580*** 
  (0.150) (0.145)  (0.132) (0.129) (0.145)  (0.123) (0.142) (0.171)  (0.137) 
Import  share  0.415*** 0.348***  0.297*** 0.332*** 0.161**  0.249*** 0.197**  0.118  0.322*** 
  (0.059) (0.074)  (0.071) (0.058) (0.080)  (0.071) (0.077) (0.105)  (0.091) 
Ability                    
Distance (Mahalanobis)  -0.006  -0.180***  -0.063  -0.050  -0.063 -0.082*  0.076*  -0.080 -0.128** 
  (0.034) (0.045)  (0.043) (0.034) (0.049)  (0.042) (0.046) (0.059)  (0.053) 
                             
Observations  5,010 3,154 3,500 4,964 3,133 3,464 5,006 3,146 3,490 
  
Note: The table reports estimates of equation (1). Definitions of the variables are in Appendix Table A1. CIS stands for Commonwealth Independent States; CEB stands 
for Central Europe and Baltic; SEE stands for South East Europe. Robust standard errors are in parentheses and the number of observations is in brackets; * significant 
at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.   35
Table 6: Testing for Business Environment: Bribery 
   New Good  New Technology  New Accreditation 
 Bribery  Bribery Bribery 
    Low Medium High  Low Medium High  Low Medium High 
Competition                 
Markup 0.490**  0.239  0.875***  0.820***  0.436**  0.542***  -0.139  -0.027  -0.106 
  (0.200) (0.189)  (0.190) (0.203) (0.195)  (0.189) (0.271) (0.262)  (0.254) 
Pressure from foreign competition                     
Low  0.001  0.078 0.055  0.146**  0.005 0.086  0.055  0.079 0.023 
  (0.064) (0.062)  (0.060) (0.067) (0.066)  (0.061) (0.088) (0.084)  (0.082) 
Medium & High  0.072  0.135**  0.081  0.208***  0.080  0.133**  0.132*  0.032  0.066 
  (0.056) (0.055)  (0.056) (0.059) (0.057)  (0.057) (0.075) (0.072)  (0.073) 
Vertical Transfer of Capability                  
Share of sales to MNEs  0.108  0.339**  0.278**  0.296***  0.147  0.183  0.656***  0.123  0.305** 
  (0.103) (0.133)  (0.120) (0.102) (0.128)  (0.119) (0.113) (0.142)  (0.142) 
Export  share  0.435***  0.040  0.206 0.198*  0.276*  0.156 0.314**  0.567***  0.489*** 
  (0.127) (0.144)  (0.152) (0.117) (0.142)  (0.137) (0.129) (0.158)  (0.156) 
Import  share  0.319*** 0.398***  0.377*** 0.197*** 0.307***  0.346*** 0.255*** 0.102  0.314*** 
  (0.066) (0.068)  (0.068) (0.068) (0.068)  (0.068) (0.087) (0.093)  (0.090) 
Ability                  
Distance (Mahalanobis)  -0.116***  -0.061  -0.002  -0.054 -0.064  -0.019 -0.082*  -0.071  0.061 
    (0.041) (0.040)  (0.039) (0.041) (0.042)  (0.039) (0.049) (0.053)  (0.053) 
Observations  3,753 3,974 3,930 3,722 3,938 3,900 3,739 3,966  3924 
 
Note: The table reports estimates of equation (1). Definitions of the variables are in Appendix Table A1. Low denotes the lowest third quantity in terms of bribery made. 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses and the number of observations is in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Appendix Table A1: Definition of Variable 
Variable Name  Variable Definition  BEEPS question 
Dummy variable. Has your company undertaken any of the following initiatives over the last 36 
months? Dummy variable is equal to one if ‘yes’ to any of the two questions: 
- Developed successfully a major new product line 
Newgood  New good or 
upgrade existing 
good 
- Upgraded an existing product line 
Newtech  New technology is 
implemented 
Dummy variable = 1 if answer is affirmative to question: Has your firm acquired new production 
technology over the last 36 months? 
Dummy variable  = 1 if answer is affirmative to question:  Newaccred  New accreditation is 
received  Has your company Obtained a new quality accreditation (ISO 9000, 9002 or 14,000, AGCCP, etc) 
over the last 36 months? Dummy variable is equal to one if ‘yes’ to any of the two questions  
Markup  Markup  Considering your main product line or main line of services in the domestic market, by what margin 
does your sales price exceed your operating costs (i.e., the cost material inputs plus wage costs but 
not overheads and depreciation)? 
ForComp Pressure  from 
foreign competition 
How would you rate the importance of pressure from foreign competition on key decisions about 
your business with respect to “Reducing the production costs of existing products or services”: 
           None  Not important 
           Low  Slightly important 
           Medium  Fairly important 
           High  Very important 
SMNE  Share of sales to 
MNEs 
Share of sales to multinationals located in your country (not including your parent company, if 
applicable) 
EXPORT  Export share  Share of sales exported directly or indirectly through a distributor 
IMPORT  Import share  Share of your firm’s material inputs and supplies that are imported directly or indirectly through a 
distributor 
L  Labor  Number of permanent and temporary employees 36 month ago 
CU  Capacity utilization  In your judgment, what is your firm’s output in comparison with the maximum output possible using 
its facilities/man power at the time 36 months ago? If you are using the facilities/man power to the 
full, answer 100%; if output was 60% of capacity, answer 60%.  
= 1 if positive expenditures on research and development (including wages and salaries of R&D 
personnel, materials, R&D related education and training costs) in previous year; 
R&D R&D  dummy 
=0 otherwise 
SKILL  Share of skilled 
workers, 3 yrs ago 
What share of your current permanent, full-time workers are skilled workers 36 months ago? 
EDU  Share of workers 
with higher 
education, 3yrs ago 
What share of the workforce at your firm has some university education in 36 months ago? 
LS  Share held by the 
largest owner 
What percentage of your firm does the largest shareholder(s) own? 
Age  Log (Firm’s age )  Year of survey minus the year when the firm was established. For the year established: In what year 
did your firm begin operations in this country? 
SOE  State owned  Government is the major shareholder (50%+) 
CNM  Compete in national 
markets  
Does your firm compete in the national market (i.e. whole country) for its main product line or 
service or does it serve primarily the local market (i.e. region, city, or neighborhood)? 1= yes. 
LOC  Location  Type of location: Capital; Other city over 1 million; Other 250,000-1,000,000; Other  50,000-
250,000; Under 50,000 
BR  Bribes  On average, what percent of total annual sales do firm’s like yours typically pay in unofficial 
payments/gifts to public officials?   37
 
Appendix Table A2: Summary Statistics. 
   Mean    SD 
Innovation Variables       
New Good  0.562    0.496 
New Technology  0.302    0.459 
New Accreditation   0.129    0.335 
Competition       
Markup  0.209    0.118 
Elasticity of demand       
Low  0.303    0.459 
Medium&High  0.477    0.499 
Pressure from foreign competition       
Low  0.173    0.378 
Medium&High  0.297    0.457 
Vertical Transfer of Capability       
Share of sales to MNEs  0.066    0.196 
Export share  0.069    0.187 
Import share  0.258    0.359 
Ability       
Distance (Mahalanobis)  3.034    0.706 
Distance(Solow)  0.364    0.377 
Controls       
lnL, 3yrs ago  3.000    1.604 
(lnL)
2, 3yrs ago  11.577    11.530 
Capacity utilization, 3yrs ago  0.794    0.206 
Positive R&D dummy  0.163    0.369 
Share of skilled workers, 3yrs ago  0.487    0.309 
Share of workers with higher education, 3yr ago  0.272    0.290 
Firm’s age  2.367    0.777 
State owned  0.118    0.322 
Compete in national markets  0.667    0.471 
   38
Appendix Table A3: Summary statistics for innovation variables by country. 




   N  Mean  SD  N  Mean  SD  N  Mean  SD  Divide each by total mean 
Yugoslavia 375  0.685  0.465  374  0.385  0.487  374 0.110  0.313 1.219  1.273  0.948 
Macedonia 268  0.552  0.498 263 0.312 0.464  267  0.079 0.270  0.982 1.031 0.680 
Albania 257  0.607  0.489  256  0.352  0.478  253  0.150  0.358  1.079 1.162 1.299 
Croatia 213  0.840  0.367  209  0.483  0.501  212  0.146  0.354  1.494 1.598 1.265 
Turkey 796  0.352  0.478  779  0.202  0.401  796  0.113  0.317  0.625 0.666 0.978 
Bosnia 225  0.653  0.477  220  0.427  0.496  223  0.130  0.337  1.162 1.413 1.125 
Slovenia 323  0.368  0.483  323  0.310  0.463  323  0.238  0.427  0.655  1.024  2.062 
Poland 1162  0.584  0.493  1159  0.319  0.466  1160  0.109  0.311  1.039 1.055 0.940 
Ukraine 791  0.671  0.470  789  0.330  0.470  791  0.090  0.286  1.194 1.090 0.776 
Belarus 409  0.729  0.445  408  0.304  0.461  409  0.086  0.280  1.296 1.005 0.740 
Hungary 615  0.426  0.495  615  0.140  0.347  615  0.228  0.420  0.758  0.462  1.969 
Czech Republic  354  0.429  0.496 352 0.213  0.410 354  0.102  0.303 0.764  0.704 0.880 
Slovakia 269  0.736  0.442  267  0.247  0.432  269  0.115  0.320  1.309  0.817  0.997 
Romania 646  0.670  0.470  643  0.387  0.488  646  0.176  0.382  1.192  1.280  1.526 
Bulgaria 397  0.569  0.496  397  0.262  0.440  396  0.081  0.273  1.012  0.866  0.699 
Moldova 352  0.636  0.482  349  0.321  0.467  352  0.060  0.237  1.132  1.061  0.516 
Latvia 242  0.591  0.493  241  0.286  0.453  242  0.066  0.249  1.051  0.947  0.572 
Lithuania 292  0.610  0.489  284  0.285  0.452  286  0.122  0.328  1.084  0.943  1.059 
Estonia 221  0.579  0.495  216  0.208  0.407  221  0.109  0.312  1.030 0.689 0.939 
Georgia 242  0.463  0.500  242  0.269  0.444  242  0.116  0.321  0.823 0.888 1.001 
Armenia 413  0.596  0.491  413  0.436  0.496  413  0.061  0.239  1.059  1.441  0.524 
Kazakhstan 680  0.490  0.500 677 0.263 0.441  680  0.104 0.306  0.871 0.869 0.903 
Azerbaijan 398  0.555  0.498  375  0.381  0.486  398  0.090  0.287 0.987  1.261  0.782 
Uzbekistan 404  0.361  0.481  403  0.226  0.419  403 0.072  0.259 0.643  0.747  0.622 
Russia 779  0.569  0.496  766  0.300  0.459  777  0.115  0.319  1.011 0.993 0.991 
Tajikistan 304  0.576  0.495  304  0.349  0.477  303  0.102  0.304  1.024  1.153  0.885 
Kyrgyzstan 238  0.613  0.488  238  0.399  0.491  238 0.122  0.328 1.091  1.320  1.054 
Total 11665  0.562  0.496  11562  0.302  0.459  11643  0.116  0.320  1.000 1.000 1.000   39
Table A4: Probit vs IV Probit Estimates on Markup 
   New   New  New  
   Product Technology  Accreditation 
Probit          
Markup 0.562***  0.613***  -0.061 
  (0.110) (0.111) (0.149) 
     
Instrumental Variables (IV) Probit     
Markup  1.915* 2.055* 0.301 
  (1.111) (1.205) (2.801) 
     
First  stage:     
F-test  28.98 26.93 20.53 
Anderson canon. corr. LR test  116.05***  107.91*** 41.24*** 
      
p-value(Overidentifying restrictions test)  0.398  0.772  0.927 
     
p-value(Exogeneity  test)  0.316 0.271 0.157 
     
No. of Observations  11,665  11,562  11,643 
 
Notes: The table reports estimates of equation (1). IV probit is implemented as in Newey (1987). 
Selection of instruments is based on Andrews (1999) and Hall and Peixe (2003).  Robust standard 
errors are in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  Table A5: Testing for Endogeneity due to the Timing of the Variables 




2002 & 2005 
Panel 
(current) 






2002 & 2005 
Panel 
(current) 






2002 & 2005 
Panel 
(current) 




  (a) (b) (c) (d) (a) (b) (c) (d) (a) (b) (c) (d) 
C o m p e t i t i o n               
Markup  0.593***  0.557**  0.497*  0.310 0.460*** -0.050  -0.524 0.654*  -0.006 0.031 0.011  -0.170 
  (0.098) (0.237) (0.300) (0.367) (0.100) (0.243) (0.328) (0.375) (0.105) (0.250) (0.346) (0.394) 
                                   
Pressure from foreign competition                  
    Low  0.159*** 0.297*** 0.331*** 0.250**  0.154*** 0.186**  0.395*** 0.342*** 0.153*** 0.244*** 0.227*  0.097 
  (0.032) (0.078) (0.112) (0.101) (0.033) (0.079) (0.112)  (0.109)  (0.035) (0.082) (0.117) (0.116) 
    Medium&High  0.276***  0.123*  0.084 0.263  **  0.261*** 0.176**  0.351*** 0.168*  0.286*** 0.189*** 0.158 0.065 
   (0.027) (0.069) (0.098) (0.087) (0.028) (0.070) (0.102)  (0.097)  (0.030) (0.072) (0.106) (0.097) 
                
Vertical  Transfer              
Sales to MNEs  0.308***  0.356***  0.191  0.305*** 0.213*** 0.158**  0.065  0.264**  0.344*** 0.374*** 0.294**  0.366*** 
  (0.033) (0.083) (0.120) (0.108) (0.032) (0.079) (0.119) (0.108) (0.033) (0.079) (0.122) (0.109) 
Export share  0.296***  0.463***  0.444*** 0.371*** 0.213*** 0.204*** 0.315*** 0.189*  0.423*** 0.494*** 0.466*** 0.442*** 
  (0.032) (0.084) (0.115) (0.116) (0.031) (0.076) (0.109) (0.110) (0.033) (0.079) (0.112) (0.114) 
Import share  0.368***  0.338***  0.319*** 0.182**  0.307*** 0.255*** 0.283*** 0.146  0.212*** 0.190*** 0.298*** 0.125 
  (0.025) (0.061) (0.088) (0.086) (0.026) (0.064) (0.092) (0.091) (0.028) (0.067) (0.098) (0.094) 
Distance                                     
Distance -0.051**  -0.109**  -0.121*  -0.113  -0.058*** -0.047 -0.055 -0.055 -0.061*** -0.085 -0.097 -0.112 
(Mahalanobis)  (0.020) (0.053) (0.072) (0.075) (0.020) (0.052) (0.074) (0.075) (0.021) (0.056) (0.080) (0.080) 
                                     
Distance -0.228***  -0.396***  -0.297*  -0.311*  -0.208*** -0.150 -0.122 -0.123 -0.517*** -0.432*** -0.583*** -0.583*** 
(Solow)  (0.047) (0.104) (0.163) (0.164) (0.048) (0.101) (0.164) (0.164) (0.052) (0.114) (0.202) (0.202) 
  
Note: Markup, Elasticity of Demand, and Pressure from Foreign Competition each enter the regressions separately. Vertical Transfer of Capability (sales to MNEs, 
Export, Import), Mahalanobis Distance and Solow residual Distance enter the regressions separately. Full Sample is with current RHS values); 2002&2005 Panel is 
with current RHS values; 2005 Panel is with both current and lagged RHS values. Sales to MNEs, Export share, and Import share are set as dummy variables equal to 
one for positive values. The coefficients in columns (a) are different from the corresponding entries in Table 1 because excluding other controls in Table A4 increases 
the sample. Robust standard errors are in parentheses and the number of observations is in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  Table A6: Baseline Specification for All Firms using Solow distance 




Competition     
Markup 0.517***  0.169  -0.337 
  (0.170) (0.167) (0.214) 
Pressure from foreign competition     
Low  0.043 0.087 0.081 
  (0.054) (0.055) (0.068) 
Medium&High 0.115**  0.149***  0.080 
  (0.049) (0.049) (0.061) 
Vertical Transfer of Capability     
Share of sales to MNEs  0.401***  0.217**  0.340*** 
  (0.107) (0.097) (0.108) 
Export share  0.248**  0.160  0.331*** 
  (0.115) (0.103) (0.114) 
Import  share  0.395*** 0.226*** 0.108 
  (0.059) (0.058) (0.072) 
Ability     
Distance (Solow)  -0.067**  -0.055*  0.033 
    (0.029) (0.029) (0.037) 
Controls     
lnL, 3yrs ago  0.135***  0.118**  0.265*** 
  (0.048) (0.050) (0.068) 
(lnL)
2,  3yrs  ago  -0.009 -0.008 -0.009 
  (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) 
Capacity utilization, 3yrs ago  -0.523***  -0.189*  -0.122 
  (0.108) (0.106) (0.132) 
Positive  R&D  dummy  0.301*** 0.262*** 0.315*** 
  (0.054) (0.050) (0.057) 
Share of skilled workers, 3yrs ago  0.060  0.042  -0.085 
  (0.071) (0.073) (0.093) 
Share of workers with higher education, 3yrs ago  0.145*  0.088  0.105 
  (0.085) (0.086) (0.108) 
Firm’s age  -0.030  -0.039  0.045 
  (0.031) (0.030) (0.036) 
State owned  -0.347***  -0.167**  -0.101 
  (0.072) (0.072) (0.085) 
Compete in national markets  0.264***  0.236***  0.250*** 
    (0.051) (0.053) (0.068) 
Observations  5,020 4,985 5,011 
 
Note: The table reports estimates of equation (1). Definitions of the variables are in Appendix Table A1. Solow residual is 
calculated using a Cobb-Douglas production function, where the dependent variables is growth rate of sales revenues; the 
independent variables include three inputs (number of employees, capital, capacity utilization), country and industry fixed 
effects, and the reported variables. Solow residual distance is the logarithm of ratio the top (country, industry) foreign 
firm's Solow residual to that of a domestic firm. Robust standard errors are in parentheses and the number of observations 
is in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 